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ACHIEVING “ADEQUACY” IN THE 
CLASSROOM 
William S. Koski*
Abstract: Though the last two decades have been marked by educa-
tional reform measures including standards-based reform, accountabil-
ity policies, and “adequacy” litigation, there is one crucial element fre-
quently absent from such schemes that is necessary to truly ensure that 
all children receive the educational resources and conditions necessary 
for an “adequate” education: meaningful reciprocal accountability. This 
article briefly discusses the recent history of education reform and its 
shortcomings to argue that a genuine reciprocal accountability system— 
one that provides effective monitoring and oversight mechanisms to lo-
cal communities, parents, and students—is crucial to ensure the provi-
sion of an adequate education for all students. To be effective, such 
monitoring systems may require simple complaint mechanisms as well 
as training to local communities and students to hold state policymakers 
and school officials accountable. Only when such a ground-level moni-
toring system is established can we hope to achieve true adequacy in 
America’s classrooms. 
Introduction 
 Educational finance reform litigation has reshaped the terrain of 
educational law and policy over the last three decades or more. Seizing 
upon arcane and often indeterminate state constitutional language, 
advocates and courts, in dialogue with legislatures and executive 
branches, have conferred educational “rights” upon children and 
communities in many states.1 At the same time, state policymakers are 
held responsible for honoring those rights.2 All told, school finance 
                                                                                                                      
 
* Eric & Nancy Wright Professor of Clinical Education and Professor of Law, Stanford 
Law School. 
1 In this paper I use the term “rights” in a broad, though not the broadest, sense—not 
merely those rights conferred by constitution or even statute, but also those benefits that 
directly or indirectly flow from systemic policy reform. 
2 For examinations of the judicial-political dialogue surrounding the implementation 
of adequacy decisions, see generally George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal 
Courts Perspective on the State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 543 (1994); Mark Jaffe 
& Kenneth Kersch, Guaranteeing a State Right to a Quality Education: The Judicial-Political 
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lawsuits have been filed in forty-five of the fifty states with challengers 
prevailing in twenty-six of the forty-five cases that resulted in a judicial 
decision.3 Although early litigation focused on the development of the 
right to equal per-pupil funding or, at a minimum, a school finance 
scheme independent of local property wealth, more recent litigation 
has sought to define qualitatively the substantive education to which 
children are constitutionally entitled.4 Recent adequacy litigation has 
pushed legal doctrine toward specifying the state’s obligation to pro-
vide an education that ensures all children possess certain skills and 
capacities.5 It has also begun to reshape educational policy in some 
cases by ordering educational interventions (e.g., universal preschool, 
whole-school reform models) and “costing out” of what is a constitu-
tionally adequate education.6 From the perspective of those bringing 
the lawsuits, what is perhaps most promising is the recent focus of some 
courts on ensuring that “at-risk” (read: poor, English Language Learner 
(ELL), disabled, and minority) children receive additional fiscal atten-
tion and educational support. As Michael Rebell argues, the new ade-
quacy litigation is a path to educational equity for such children.7
 Parallel to recent adequacy litigation, state legislatures and ex-
ecutives have embraced the now inseparable policies of standards-
based reform and accountability for student outcomes.8 Standards-
based reform has sought, among other things, to combat low educa-
tional expectations for poor and minority children. By establishing 
                                                                                                                      
Dialogue in New Jersey, 20 J.L. & Educ. 271 (1991); William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial 
Decision-Making in Educational Policy Reform Litigation, 55 Hastings L.J. 1077 (2004). 
3 Molly A. Hunter, Nat’l Access Network, “Equity” and “Adequacy” School Funding Court De-
cisions, http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/equityandadequacytable.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2006); Molly A. Hunter, Nat’l Access Network, Litigations Challenging the Constitutional-
ity of K-12 Funding in the 50 States, http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/In-Process%20 
Litigations.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). Note that these statistics are current as of Septem-
ber 2006. 
4 See generally William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When Adequate Isn’t Enough: The Retreat from 
Equality in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 Emory L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 
2007) (manuscript on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal) (discussing 
the shift from “equity” to “adequacy” in educational finance reform litigation). 
5 See id. (manuscript at 19) (discussing the constitutional standards for “adequacy” be-
ing developed by courts). 
6 For a discussion of specific remedies in adequacy lawsuits, including “costing-out” 
studies and methodologies, as well as specific educational interventions, see id. (manu-
script at 25–27). 
7 See Michael A. Rebell, Adequacy Litigations: A New Path to Equity?, in Bringing Equity 
Back: Research for a New Era in American Educational Policy 291 ( Janice Pet-
rovich & Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005). 
8 For an extended discussion of standards-based reform and the “new accountability” 
in educational policy reform, see Koski & Reich, supra note 4 (manuscript at 40). 
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challenging content standards for what children should know and be 
able to do, and assessing students to determine whether they have 
achieved those standards, standards-based reform attempts to raise 
individual achievement to what the state determines is proficient. 
Ideally, schools would possess or develop the capacity (including 
knowledge, skills, and resources; leadership; and structures and or-
ganization) to organize around and teach to high standards. In a 
sense, standards-based reform deregulates public schooling. It per-
mits both top-down and bottom-up reform by moving away from dic-
tating educational inputs and processes from state capitals, and mov-
ing toward outcomes-based expectations. Schools, in turn, are left to 
develop their own strategies to achieve high standards. 
 Beginning approximately a decade ago, standards-based reform 
has been supplemented by an additional policy lever—accountability of 
both schools and children for student performance on standards-based 
achievement tests. This “new accountability” in public education pro-
vides rewards for those schools, administrators, or schools who have 
succeeded—and sanctions for those who have not—in meeting student 
achievement targets. At a minimum, school- and district-wide perform-
ance on standards-based assessments are published and subjected to 
public scrutiny. Successful schools are provided with commendations 
and, sometimes, monetary rewards. At the other end, failing schools 
may be offered technical assistance and temporary grants to improve, 
while persistently failing schools may be subject to stiff measures such 
as state takeover or reconstitution. Students are now being tested for 
what they know and should be able to do through periodic, state-wide, 
criterion-based assessments and, in a growing number of states, high-
stakes testing such as high school exit exams.9
                                                                                                                      
9 See Ronald A. Skinner, State of the States, 24 Educ. Wk. 77, 77 (2005); see also Cal. Educ. 
Code §§ 60850–60859 (2003) (noting that students must pass the state High School Exit 
Exam to obtain a high school diploma in California); Student Assessment Div., Texas 
Educ. Agency, High School Graduation Requirements, http://www.tea.state.tx.us/stu 
dent.assessment/resources/grad/grad_reqs.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2006) (explaining that 
students must past the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills or Texas Assessment of 
Academic Skills tests to obtain a high school diploma in Texas); Mass. Dep’t of Educ., About 
the MCAS, http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/about1.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2006) (indicat-
ing that students must pass the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System to obtain a 
high school diploma in Massachusetts); 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 335 (providing that Michigan 
will endorse diplomas for those students who reach proficiency of state examinations in cer-
tain subjects). 
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 Standards-based accountability regimes, like the No Child Left Be-
hind Act,10 though promising to raise the performance of poor and 
minority children and close the achievement gap, are frequently criti-
cized for failing to provide the necessary educational resources and 
conditions for all children to achieve at high levels.11 Indeed, one 
might ask whether it is acceptable to hold students accountable for fail-
ing to learn without providing them the necessary opportunities to 
learn. 
 This is where the modern adequacy litigation and the new ac-
countability are beginning to embrace each other in the courtroom. 
Scholars and advocates have argued that it is appropriate and neces-
sary for courts to hold states accountable under state constitutional 
education articles for providing the resources required for teachers to 
teach to, and children to learn at, the levels authorized by legislatures 
and often established by executive branches.12 Although no state 
court has gone so far as to constitutionalize state educational stan-
dards, many judges are citing the failure of students to reach profi-
ciency on state-mandated tests as evidence of educational inadequacy.13 
The result is a dialogue among courts, politicians, and education ad-
vocates: political branches establish expectations for local perform-
ance, schools and educators organize themselves to meet those stan-
dards, and courts oversee the political branches to ensure that they 
are providing the conditions necessary to achieve the desired results. 
As James Liebman and Charles Sabel have argued, courts in educa-
tional finance litigation are beginning to create public forums in which 
the political branches, educational insiders, and “new publics”14 can 
“discuss comprehensive reforms of American education that draw on 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (to be codified as amended primarily 
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
11 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Bartman, Public Education in the 21st Century: How Do We Ensure 
That No Child Is Left Behind?, 12 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 95, 111–12 (2002); Koski & 
Reich, supra note 4 (manuscript at 25–27). 
12 See William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and Accountability in an Era of Standards-
Based School Reform, 12 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 301, 313–14 (2001); James S. Liebman, Im-
plementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively 
Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 Va. L. Rev. 349, 423–28 (1990). 
13 See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 260 (N.C. 1997); Brigham v. State, 692 
A.2d 384, 389–90 (Vt. 1997); Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 262 
(N.D. 1994); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 144 (Tenn. 1993). 
14 See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: 
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 
183, 207, 266–67 (2003) (describing “new publics” as a phenomenon in which a new col-
lective action focused on the collective good arises after public policies fail to meet the 
needs of the public). 
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linked innovations in school governance, performance measurement, 
and the reconceptualization of the teaching profession and peda-
gogy.”15
 Although I agree that adequacy litigation holds the promise of lev-
eraging from state policymakers the resources necessary for all children 
to reach proficiency, I am less sanguine than Liebman and Sabel that 
the “new publics,” especially those who are politically marginalized, will 
necessarily possess the tools required to ensure that policymakers and 
bureaucrats provide the requisite resources for sustained reform. This 
is where “reciprocal accountability” must enter the equation.16 While it 
is no longer vogue to speak of bureaucratic monitoring, and while I am 
aware of the potential difficulties in the proceduralization of educa-
tional rights, I nonetheless argue here that any educational adequacy 
campaign must include the demand for the tools and roles for local 
communities, parents, and students to hold the system accountable for 
educational resources at the classroom level. These tools must include 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
 Part I of this article explains how modern adequacy litigation and 
standards-based accountability policies can (and do) define and refine 
the substantive right to an education. Notwithstanding this abstract en-
titlement, local communities, particularly poor and minority communi-
ties, may still lack the technical expertise to participate in the day-to-day 
restructuring of schools; the political strength to enforce educational 
rights in state capitals; and the resources to challenge in court routine 
deprivations of a student, classroom, or school’s rights. For these rea-
sons, and to ensure true reciprocal accountability, adequacy litigation 
must demand mechanisms for meaningful monitoring and oversight to 
ensure the provision of the necessary educational resources, as well as 
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. at 266. 
16 Modern standards-based reform and accountability schemes seek to leverage school 
improvement by holding schools, teachers, and students accountable for student out-
comes. Those systems only rarely hold the educational system and institutions (read: poli-
cymakers and governing agencies) accountable for what they must contribute to the stan-
dards-based reform process, including the capacity, resources, and conditions for all 
children to succeed. The concept of “reciprocal accountability,” through which all educa-
tion stakeholders hold each other accountable for inputs, processes, and outcomes, ad-
dresses this shortcoming of standards-based reform and accountability. Based loosely on 
the work of Richard Elmore, Agency, Reciprocity, and Accountability in Democratic Education, in 
The Public Schools 277 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds., 2005), my definition 
of “reciprocal accountability” requires that a standards-based accountability system should 
include at least these key components: high standards, adequate resources, capacity for 
teaching and learning, fair assessments with even-handed consequences, and a strong re-
porting system. 
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the procedural rights for parents, children, and communities to redress 
educational deprivations through simple and inexpensive complaint 
mechanisms. Through monitoring and creating accountability schemes 
for not only outcomes but also resources, educational rights can be re-
alized in the classroom. 
 Part II will then review the history of school finance litigation and 
standards-based reform in California through the recent Williams v. 
California litigation.17 The article will suggest that California suffers 
from a personality conflict: while it demands accountability to high 
standards and even recognizes to some extent that the State should be 
held accountable for providing educational resources at the classroom 
level, it nonetheless refuses to ensure that students are entitled to an 
adequate education. Though Serrano v. Priest 18 and Butt v. State 19 prom-
ise California’s children a right to an essentially equal education, and 
although the Williams settlement aims to ensure that children are all 
provided with basic educational necessities—textbooks, qualified teach-
ers, and clean, safe facilities—through a bureaucratic monitoring sys-
tem,20 the failure of the State to design a resource distribution and ac-
countability system that addresses the needs of all children has still left 
children without adequate resources to reach the State’s demanding 
educational content standards. Despite these shortcomings of state pol-
icy, the article suggests that the Williams litigation provides a good start 
toward developing monitoring and reciprocal accountability schemes 
that promise local communities a meaningful voice in school reform. 
I. Educational Rights and Realities 
 The full recognition of a right to an education is still a work in pro-
gress. In the last twenty years, two strands of educational law and pol-
icy—adequacy litigation and standards-based reform and accountabil-
ity—have worked separately and, in a few instances, together to develop 
and refine the educational resources and educational outcomes that we 
should expect from our school systems.21 This section discusses the 
                                                                                                                      
 
17 Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000). 
18 See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I ) 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), aff’d after remand, Serrano 
v. Priest (Serrano II ) 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
19 See 842 P.2d 1240, 1248–51 (Cal. 1992). 
20 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
21 Here I do not intend to restate and reanalyze the already well-trod ground of the 
history of educational finance reform litigation. An enormous body of literature already 
examines this rich history. See generally Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance: 
Issues and Perspectives (Helen R. Ladd et al. eds., 1999); William H. Clune, New Answers 
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contours of the right to an education, focusing on how that right is in-
creasingly tied to the needs of students and communities and how that 
right is not only defined by expected outcomes but also by the re-
sources and conditions necessary to reach those outcomes in the class-
room. Even if this nascent effort to define the inputs required for all 
children to achieve at high levels is sustained, one still should not as-
sume complacently that those resources and conditions will actually be 
delivered. Policymakers and school systems must be held accountable 
to children, parents, and communities for providing those educational 
necessities. The section concludes by proposing a system of reciprocal 
accountability—one that incorporates monitoring and enforcement— 
that can ensure that rights are made real. 
A. Educational Finance Reform Litigation and the Substantive  
Right to an Education 
 According to the standard narrative, school finance litigation has 
developed in three waves.22 The initial wave of school finance litigation, 
lasting from 1971 until 1973, was based on the argument that the U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational 
Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 721, 722–23 (1992); 
Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand. L. 
Rev. 101, 104–42 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the 
“Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1151 (1995); William S. Koski, Of 
Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-examination of the Jurisprudential History of 
Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1185 (2003) [hereinafter 
Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards]; Koski, supra note 2; James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword 
to Symposium on School Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 463 (2004); James Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 Yale L.J. 249, 256 (1999); 
William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Mas-
sachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597 (1994); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: 
The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance 
Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & Educ. 219 (1990) [hereinafter Thro, The Third Wave]; Julie K. 
Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 517 (1991); Symposium, Adequacy Litigation in School Finance, 28 U. 
Mich. J.L. Reform 481 (1995); Symposium, Investing in Our Children’s Future: School Finance 
Reform in the ‘90s, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 293 (1991); Symposium, Issues in Educational Law 
and Policy, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 543 (1994); Symposium, School Finance Litigation, Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 463 (2004); Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to 
Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 507 (1991); William E. Thro, 
Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Fi-
nance Litigation, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1639 (1989) [hereinafter Thro, To Render Them Safe]. 
22 See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 21 (developing the wave metaphor that has 
provided a descriptive typology to three eras in educational finance reform). But see Koski, 
Of Fuzzy Standards, supra note 21 (noting how second- and third-wave cases are not so dis-
tinct from each other). 
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Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause guaranteed that school districts 
receive substantially equal funding or, at a minimum, that the resources 
available to a school district should not be dependent on the property 
wealth of the district.23 After enjoying initial success in at least two fed-
eral district courts and the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. 
Priest,24 the federal Equal Protection theory came to a screeching halt 
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.25
 The New Jersey Supreme Court ushered in the second wave of 
school finance cases with its discovery of educational rights in state 
constitutions.26 Thereafter, most state high courts relied heavily on 
state education articles and, at times, employed these in conjunction 
with the state’s constitutional equality provision to find school spend-
ing schemes unconstitutional.27 Second-wave courts sought to achieve 
either horizontal equity among school districts, so that per-pupil reve-
nues were roughly equalized, or fiscal neutrality, so that revenues 
available to a school district would not be solely dependent on the 
property wealth of the school district. But this so-called “equity litiga-
tion” met with limited success in the courts, so reformers abandoned 
the rhetoric of equality as a right and instead embraced adequacy in 
the 1990s.28
 The Kentucky Supreme Court launched the third wave in 1989 
when it turned to the education article of its state constitution and con-
                                                                                                                      
23 See Heise, supra note 21, at 1153–57 (1995); John Coons et al., Private Wealth 
and Public Education 2 (1970) (“The quality of public education may not be a function 
of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole”) (emphasis omitted). 
24 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), aff’d after remand, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
25 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that Texas’s school financing plan met the requirements 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see Heise, supra note 21, at 
1157–58; see also Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 
1971), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that the Texas school financing plan violated stu-
dents’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Van Du-
sartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971) (striking down the Minnesota school 
financing system as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
26 See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297–98 (N.J. 1973) (striking down the New Jer-
sey education financing system based on state constitutional principles); Heise, supra note 
21, at 1157–62; Thro, To Render Them Safe, supra note 21, at 1653–56. This second wave 
lasted from 1973 until approximately 1989. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 21, at 225. 
27 See, e.g., Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. 
1980) (bolstering the state’s equality provision with the state’s education article to find the 
funding system unconstitutional); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 
(Ark. 1983) (finding that an analysis of the education article reinforced the holding that 
the funding system was unconstitutional under the equality provision). 
28 Heise, supra note 21, at 1162. 
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sidered the substantive education that article mandates.29 Third wave 
cases continue to rely on state education articles, but shift toward theo-
ries of educational adequacy, not equity, as the theory of educational 
rights.30 Notably, the same education articles that provided, for in-
stance, for a “thorough and efficient” education that had been used to 
support equity claims in the second wave were now deployed in the 
third wave to establish the competencies and skills that all children 
should have an opportunity to acquire as a constitutional right.31
 The Kentucky Supreme Court, interpreting the thorough and 
efficient clause of its state constitution, held that its legislature must 
provide its students with such an adequate education.32 Under the 
Kentucky Constitution, an adequate education included the opportu-
nity to develop seven capabilities, including sufficient oral and written 
communication skills to function in a complex and rapidly changing 
society and sufficient academic or vocational skills to enable students 
to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states.33 
Commentators and scholars quickly identified the importance of the 
1989 Kentucky case as the bellwether for the shift from equity to ade-
quacy.34
 More than fifteen years into the adequacy movement, there has 
been a maturation of both litigation strategies and the corresponding 
judicial responses to those strategies.35 For purposes of this discussion 
of educational rights, most striking are three aspects of modern ade-
quacy litigation. First, advocates and courts have begun to embrace 
the idea that certain populations of disadvantaged students should be 
afforded additional resources in order to reach an adequate level of 
educational outcome.36 To some, such as Michael Rebell, this accep-
tance of educational rights based on educational need is an indication 
of how courts have begun to introduce the concept of vertical equity 
into adequacy litigation.37
 In modern adequacy cases, the most evident manifestation of 
needs-based rights comes in the methods used in costing-out an ade-
                                                                                                                      
29 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205 (Ky. 1989); Heise, supra note 
21, at 1163; Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 21, at 543. 
30 Heise, supra note 21, at 1162; Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards, supra note 21, at 1192. 
31 See Levine, supra note 21, at 508. 
32 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
33 Id. 
34 See Heise, supra note 21, at 1163; Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 21, at 241. 
35 Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 21, at 543. 
36 See Koski & Reich, supra note 4 (manuscript at 21, 28). 
37 See id. (manuscript at 21). See generally Rebell, supra note 7. 
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quate education, that is, attaching a price tag to the resources necessary 
for all children to reach specified educational outcomes. Naturally, dif-
ficult questions such as “adequacy for what?” and “what resources are 
necessary to produce such adequacy?” are central to such costing-out 
(or “adequacy”) studies. Currently, four overlapping methodologies for 
determining the cost of an adequate education have been employed in 
school finance litigation: the professional judgment (or market basket) 
model, the evidence-based professional judgment (or reliable research) 
model, the successful schools model, and the cost function model.38
 Both the professional judgment and evidence-based models look 
primarily to educational inputs to determine what comprises an ade-
quate education.39 The professional judgment model identifies the stu-
dent outcomes desired and employs focus groups of experienced edu-
cators and policymakers to develop the basket of goods necessary for all 
children to achieve those outcomes.40 These goods include facilities, 
administrative structures, teachers, and instructional materials.41 The 
professional judgment method also considers resources and program-
matic interventions for special populations of children such as ELLs 
and children with disabilities.42 The evidence-based model determines 
resource needs by identifying research-based “best practices,” such as 
class-size reduction or comprehensive whole-school reform models, and 
by determining the costs of providing those interventions.43 The chal-
lenge with the evidence-based approach is that the extant evidence on 
“what works” is limited, inconsistent or unreliable in many areas. 
                                                                                                                      
38 For a more extended analysis of the four methodologies described here, see William 
D. Duncombe & John M. Yinger, Performance Standards and Educational Cost Indexes: You 
Can’t Have One Without the Other, in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance: Issues 
and Perspectives 260, 282–91 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999) (describing sophisticated 
statistical models for developing a foundation aid plan that would provide an adequate 
education to achieve specified performance standards); Maurice Dyson, The Death of Robin 
Hood? Proposals for Overhauling Public School Finance, 11 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 1 
(2004); James W. Guthrie & Richard Rothstein, Enabling “Adequacy” to Achieve Reality: Trans-
lating Adequacy into State School Finance Distribution Arrangements, in Equity and Adequacy 
in Education Finance, supra at 209, 214–46 (describing the professional judgment 
method and critiquing the “black box” inferential approach); Steve Smith, Education Ade-
quacy Litigation: History, Trends, and Research, 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 107, 115–19 
(2004); Quality Counts 2005: No Small Change: Targeting Money Toward Student Performance, 24 
Educ. Wk. 1, 29–36 (2005); Bruce D. Baker et al., Measuring Educational Adequacy in 
Public Schools (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
39 See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 232–33; Smith, supra note 38, at 115. 
40 Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 233; Smith, supra note 38, at 116. 
41 See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 245; Smith, supra note 38, at 116. 
42 See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 245. 
43 See Smith, supra note 38, at 117. 
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 The successful schools and cost-function strategies focus instead 
on outcome data to estimate the cost of an adequate education.44 The 
successful schools model looks to school districts that are achieving 
state outcomes standards and uses statistical techniques to infer what an 
adequate amount of funding would be based on those districts’ expen-
ditures.45 This model is less concerned with determining precise inputs 
because it assumes that, given a sufficient amount of overall dollars, 
districts would efficiently deploy those dollars to achieve the desired 
outcomes.46
 Finally, the cost-function model employs regression techniques to 
estimate the effects of school spending, student demographics and lo-
cal cost-of-living on student outcomes.47 The advantage of the cost-
function approach is that it allows policymakers to make fine-tuned de-
cisions regarding the cost of achieving adequate outcomes in districts 
with differing characteristics, such as the proportion of poor children 
or the regional cost of living.48 Like the successful schools model, how-
ever, its estimates are highly dependent on the assumptions made. 
 While all of these models possess advantages and disadvantages, 
the important point for this discussion is that while all four are de-
signed to cost-out an adequate education, all four can—and sometimes 
do—infuse equity values into their calculations by targeting resources 
to underprivileged children. Costing-out studies help policymakers pro-
vide needs-based rights to certain populations of children. For instance, 
experts developing the market basket frequently provide additional 
resources for remedial reading programs and free breakfast and lunch 
for low-income children, English remediation for ELLs, and mandatory 
preschool and all-day kindergarten for children in low-income school 
districts. Similarly, the successful schools model frequently corrects for 
poverty levels within a poor school district or the number of ELL stu-
dents in the district, much like the cost-function model does by design. 
 The second striking development in modern adequacy litigation 
is how judicial remedies are increasingly relying upon research-based 
educational interventions designed to raise educational achievement. 
The prototype for such a remedy is a recent order in the now epic Ab-
                                                                                                                      
44 See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 244; Smith, supra note 38, at 115. 
45 See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 224; Smith, supra note 38, at 117–18. 
46 See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 225; Smith, supra note 38, at 118. 
47 See Duncombe & Yinger, supra note 38, at 291; Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 
246-47; Smith, supra note 38, at 118. 
48 See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 38, at 246; Smith, supra note 38, at 118. 
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bott v. Burke litigation.49 In Abbott II, twenty-nine of New Jersey’s poor-
est districts filed a lawsuit claiming that the State had failed to equal-
ize funding among those districts and the richest districts and to pro-
vide for the educational needs of children in poor districts as was 
required by New Jersey’s Robinson v. Cahill decision.50 Since 1989, the 
New Jersey legislature and Supreme Court have debated what com-
prises an adequate education for the Abbott District children.51 Most 
recently, the court has become quite prescriptive,52 ordering that Ab-
bott districts should be provided with specific educational resources, 
including half-day preschool for three- and four-year-olds and imple-
mentation of whole-school reform models that have been demon-
strated successful in other school districts.53
 Third, courts in modern adequacy litigation are, in some cases, 
straying from their historic role in education litigation of mandating 
and superintending remedial schemes (for example, desegregation 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II ), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III ), 
643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) (per curiam); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV ), 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V ), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI ), 748 A.2d 82 
(N.J. 2000); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VII ), 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000). See generally Alexandra 
Greif, Essay, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s Experience Implementing the Abbott V 
Mandate, 22 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 615 (2004). 
50 See Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 363; see also Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297–98 (N.J. 
1973) (holding that where there is a disparity in the number of dollars spent per pupil 
based on district or residence, the state has an obligation to equalize the sums available 
per pupil). 
51 See generally Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359; Abbott III, 643 A.2d 575; Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417; 
Abbot V, 710 A.2d 450; Abbott VI, 748 A.2d 82; Abbot VII, 751 A.2d 1032. 
52 Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 464–474. In at least two other adequacy litigations, trial courts 
have ordered specific interventions that target at-risk children. See Abbeville County Sch. 
Dist. v. State (S.C. Ct. of Com. Pl., 3rd Jud. Cir., 1999), available at http://www.scschool 
case.com/Abbeville-County-Order.pdf (finding that poverty directly causes lower student 
achievement and that the state constitution imposes an obligation on the state “to create 
an educational system that overcomes . . . the effects of poverty”); Tico A. Almeida, Essay, 
Re-focusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children: Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 
22 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 525, 538–40 (2004). Yet there are courts that have rejected such 
interventionist specificity: the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected a trial court’s order that 
the state provide mandatory preschool for poor children. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. 
Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 501 (Ark. 2002). 
53 I hasten to note that I do not want to over-state the extent to which courts are defin-
ing educational rights to consider the needs of at-risk children or to include specific edu-
cational programming. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the potential for such equity-
minded reform is still mostly hopeful potential. I merely emphasize the extent to which 
adequacy litigations are beginning to reshape the educational rights terrain for at-risk 
students. See Koski & Reich, supra note 4 (manuscript at 31). 
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litigation and remedial decrees).54 Rather, as James Liebman and 
Charles Sabel argue, courts in adequacy litigation appear to be play-
ing a coordinating role among reformers, policymakers, and educa-
tional insiders, as states work to develop an adequate education sys-
tem.55 Rather than dictating command-and-control remedial schemes 
or providing a forum for traditional consent-decree bargaining, 
Liebman and Sabel argue that courts are overseeing the process by 
which schools, the interests affected by schooling, and civil society in 
general collaborate in devising school reform measures and are peri-
odically correcting those measures based on empirical reality.56 Cen-
tral to this formula is the disentrenchment of established political in-
terests by diverse “new publics” with connected interests (community 
groups, business leaders, civic and professional organizations) who 
coalesce around education reform.57
 The paradigmatic example of this new judicial role is Kentucky’s 
fabled Rose litigation.58 There, a tacit “collusion” among the policy elite, 
media, and public appears to have influenced the outcome of the 
case.59 Specifically, a former Governor represented the plaintiffs, the 
then-current Governor openly called for reform, and the legislature 
quickly responded to the judicial decision with a comprehensive re-
form package.60 As Kern Alexander, who was instrumental in develop-
ing the trial court’s definition of what comprises an “efficient” educa-
tion, put it: 
A most striking aspect of the Kentucky case was the breadth of 
the court’s ruling and the promptness of the legislative re-
sponse. The court’s decision led directly to a complete revi-
sion of the scheme of school finance and substantial modifica-
tion in the organization and administration of the public 
                                                                                                                      
54 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 14, at 205–07; Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1016, 1022–28 
(2004). 
55 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 14, at 206–07, 278–79. 
56 Id. at 278–79. 
57 Id. at 266–67. 
58 See generally Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
59 See Ronald G. Dove, Jr., Acorns in a Mountain Pool: The Role of Litigation, Law and Law-
yers in Kentucky Education Reform, 17 J. Educ. Fin. 83, 118–19 (1991) (arguing that social 
relations among the key actors influenced the outcome of the Rose litigation); D. Frank 
Vinik, The Contrasting Politics of Remedy: The Alabama and Kentucky School Equity Funding Liti-
gation, 22 J. Educ. Fin. 60, 60–61 (1996) (comparing the impact of social relations on edu-
cation reform litigation in Kentucky and Alabama). 
60 Burt J. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law: The Kentucky School Reform Law, 28 Harv. J. 
on Legis. 367, 367–76 (1991). 
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schools. . . . The court provided the legislature with both the 
nerve and the rationale to raise taxes, equalize school fund-
ing, and make other necessary changes.61
In other states (Texas, for example), courts have hosted a continuous 
dialogue between the state legislature and the public to refine the 
meaning of educational adequacy.62 Liebman and Sabel “call this new 
form of judicial review ‘non-court-centric judicial review’ because it al-
lows the court to participate in a process of building a constitutional or-
der, rather than imposing one or abandoning its obligation to do so.”63
 As a matter of state constitutional principle, courts and legislatures 
are beginning to ascribe meaning to the right to an education through 
an iterative process of judicial decision and legislative response that fo-
cuses on providing the resources and conditions necessary for all chil-
dren—particularly at-risk children—to obtain certain capacities and, 
perhaps, reach proficiency as measured by the state’s own educational 
content standards. 
B. Standards-Based Reform and the “New Accountability”  
in Education  
 The area of standards-based reform and the “new accountability” 
in education is where state policy has been at work in defining the 
right to an education.64 The premise undergirding the standards 
movement is the idea that all children can achieve at high levels; all 
we need to do is raise the bar and they will leap over it.65 Coupled 
with the development of standards and the push to measure perform-
ance, many states have also begun to hold schools and students ac-
countable for such measured performance.66 The primary elements 
of the standards-based reform strategy as it has been enacted in most 
states are threefold: (1) the state sets broad and high minimum “con-
                                                                                                                      
61 Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The 
Kentucky Case, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 341, 343 (1991). 
62 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 14, at 205–06. For a description of how the court 
and legislature have iteratively developed the meaning of a constitutional education in 
Texas, see id. at 232–39. 
63 Id. at 281. 
64 See Leibman & Sabel, supra note 14, at 229–30. 
65 See generally Stuart C. Purkey & Marshall S. Smith, Effective Schools: A Review, 83 Ele-
mentary Sch. J. 427 (1983). 
66 See Koski & Reich, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39); see also Milbrey W. McLaughlin 
& Lorrie Sheppard, Improving Education Through Standards-Based Reform xviii–
xix (1995). 
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tent standards” that describe the knowledge, skills, and abilities that 
schools are expected to teach and students are expected to learn in 
core academic content areas, such as math, science, reading, and social 
studies; (2) the state sets “performance standards” that provide explicit 
definitions of what students must know to demonstrate a mastery of the 
content standards; and (3) the state fairly and accurately assesses 
whether students have attained those standards.67 To date, virtually 
every state has approved standards in major curriculum areas.68
 In the latter half of the 1990s, the standards-based reform for-
mula began to be supplemented by an additional policy lever: ac-
countability of districts, schools, and students for student outcomes 
on standards-based assessments. Emblematic of the “new accountabil-
ity” movement is the 2001 reauthorization of Title I of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act, the No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB).69 NCLB, like its predecessor, the Improving America’s 
Schools Act (IASA), has a threefold purpose: (1) to free school dis-
tricts from burdensome and ineffective inputs monitoring under Title 
I, which frequently resulted in the discredited practice of pull-out 
compensatory education services; (2) to set high expectations for all 
students, especially poor and minority students who were not held to 
the same expectations as their wealthier and non-minority peers; and 
(3) to hold schools accountable for student outcomes.70
 Under NCLB, states must establish challenging “content stan-
dards” and “student academic achievement standards” in reading, 
math, and science that reflect an adequate educational outcome for all 
students in the state.71 Next, states must use assessments aligned with 
those standards to hold schools accountable for ensuring that their 
students make adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward proficiency with 
the goal of reaching proficiency by 2014.72 Significantly, such AYP must 
not only be achieved school-wide, it must also be achieved for all sig-
                                                                                                                      
67 See Koski & Reich, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39). 
68 Leibman & Sabel, supra note 14, at 208; Skinner, supra note 9, at 77. 
69 Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (to be codified as amended primarily in 
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
70 See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 932, 937–39 (2004) (discussing how the NCLB furthers the approach of the IASA in 
providing funds to create high standards for all students, not merely remedial instruction 
for disadvantaged students); see also James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No 
Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1703, 
1708–25 (2003) (discussing the “new accountability” in education and the NCLB’s adop-
tion of many of its principles). 
71 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2003). 
72 Id. §§ 6311(b)(2)–(3), 6316. 
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nificant socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic subpopulations, encompass-
ing many at-risk populations (e.g., migrant students, students with dis-
abilities, ELLs, and major racial and ethnic groups).73 Schools failing to 
meet these goals are deemed “in need of improvement” and receive 
graduated interventions.74 After two years of failure, schools receive 
technical assistance and must develop improvement plans, while stu-
dents in those schools may choose to go to another school in the dis-
trict.75 If the school continues to fail for three years, students who have 
not left may receive tutoring services from an outside provider.76 After 
four years, school staff may be replaced, while after five years, the school 
must seek alternate governance by agreeing to be taken over by the 
state or to be directed by a qualified private management company.77
 Those who study educational accountability, however, are quick 
to point out that merely raising academic standards, assessing student 
achievement, and holding districts, schools, and teachers accountable 
for that achievement is not enough to ensure that all children— par-
ticularly low-performing children—attain proficiency.78 The success of 
external accountability schemes hinges in part on the school’s capac-
ity to organize teaching and learning to achieve the goals of the state’s 
standards-based reform scheme.79 Significantly, such capacity must 
                                                                                                                      
73 Id. § 6311(b)(2)–(3). 
74 Id. §§ 6311(a), 6316(b). 
75 Id. § 6316(b). 
76 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b)(5)(B) (West 2003). 
77 Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv)(I), (b)(8). The other significant aspect of the NCLB for 
purposes of this article is that it requires all Title I schools to hire only “highly qualified” 
teachers and that current teachers must demonstrate that they are “highly qualified” by 
2005–2006. Id. § 6319(a)(2)–(3). 
78 See generally Richard Elmore, Accountability and Capacity, in The New Accountabil-
ity: High Schools and High-Stakes Testing 195 (Martin Carnoy et al. eds., 2003). 
79 Richard Elmore, a leading scholar on educational accountability, has commented 
that external accountability systems work not by exerting direction and control over 
schools, but by mobilizing and focusing the capacity of schools in particular ways. The 
people who work in schools, and the systems that surround them, are not just active agents 
in determining the effects of accountability systems. Their knowledge, skill, values, and 
commitments, as well as the nature of the organizations in which they work, determine how 
their schools will respond. Id. at 196. The dimensions of capacity are: (1) internal account-
ability (“the shared norms, values, expectations, structures, and processes that determine 
the relationship between individual actions and collective results in schools”); (2) struc-
ture; (3) leadership; and (4) knowledge, skill, and resources. Id. at 197–98, 201, 203, 206. 
All these elements of capacity are effectively what the architects of standards-based reform 
would have called “opportunities to learn” or “service delivery standards.” See, e.g., Jeannie 
Oakes et al., Accountability for Adequate and Equitable Opportunities to Learn, in Holding Ac-
countability Accountable: What Ought to Matter in Public Education 92–94 
(Kenneth A. Sirotnik ed., 2004). 
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include the tangible resources—instructional materials, appropriate 
facilities, and highly-qualified teachers—to ensure that all schools 
have the opportunity to teach to their respective high standards and 
all students have the opportunity to reach those standards. 
 Yet most standards-based accountability systems have fallen short 
of ensuring that schools have the capacity to reform themselves. 
Granted, many accountability schemes provide to failing schools mod-
est infusions of cash, some technical assistance, and even a period of 
time to design and implement school improvement plans. Equally 
common, however, are policies that do nothing to build the capacity of 
failing schools, but rather permit students in those schools to avoid the 
policies altogether.80 But, as Harvard educational researcher Richard 
Elmore and his colleagues found in a recent study of accountability in 
high schools, “there isn’t much evidence . . . of major external invest-
ments in new knowledge and skill in schools.”81 So long as state ac-
countability policies are based on the theory that external pressure for 
performance can mobilize existing capacity rather than create new ca-
pacity, “it is possible that the long-term effect of accountability policies 
. . . could be to increase the gap in performance between high and low 
capacity schools.”82 An educational policy that endeavors to ensure that 
schools produce proficient learners will not succeed without the capac-
ity to produce those learners. 
 The marriage of standards-based accountability and adequacy 
litigation, however, provides the possibility that opportunities to learn 
can be achieved through litigation. Indeed, whether at the point of 
identifying the substantive elements of an adequate education or de-
signing the appropriate remedial interventions, courts are beginning 
to compel policymakers to flesh-out the substantive entitlement to 
educational resources and conditions based on the state’s own ex-
pected educational outcomes. 
 While this sounds hopeful, two major caveats remain. First, even in 
those courts that have entered the school reform fracas, judges have 
just barely begun to look to standards-based accountability schemes as 
guidance for determining whether states have offered a constitutionally 
adequate education to their children. Even fewer have relied upon out-
put standards in crafting or approving remedial finance schemes or 
                                                                                                                      
80 Examples of such policies are those that provide compensatory or remedial educa-
tion, and those that permit students to transfer out of failing schools. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6301. 
81 Elmore, supra note 78, at 206. 
82 Id. at 206–08. 
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school reform remedies.83 Second, and the subject to which I now turn, 
is the difficulty of relying on the judicial system as the primary en-
forcement mechanism to ensure that necessary resources and condi-
tions will be delivered at the classroom level. As a consequence, the fu-
ture of adequacy litigation should seek to secure and implement 
meaningful, user-friendly monitoring and enforcement schemes. 
C. Enforcing Educational Rights Through Monitoring and  
Reciprocal Accountability 
 Accountability in American public education is hardly a new con-
cept. School board members who have failed to develop effective local 
policies or hire effective leaders are politically accountable to voters. 
Teachers and staff are bureaucratically accountable to their principals 
and superintendents. School districts were traditionally accountable to 
accreditation organizations and the federal government for certain in-
puts—library books, lab equipment, and certified teachers. What is strik-
ingly new about the new accountability is the focus on student out-
comes as the standard for performance. Any accountability system must 
answer the questions: Accountability of whom, to whom, for what, and 
how? Modern accountability policies generally answer those questions 
by holding teachers, schools, districts, and sometimes students ac-
countable to the state for student achievement on standards-based as-
sessments. The “how” in such systems is typically a system of rewards for 
successful schools and graduated punishments for those who do not 
meet proficiency standards. 
 While schools and districts are held accountable to the public for 
student performance through public reporting, the tools available to 
families and communities to pressure schools to improve are, in my 
view, ill-defined and not well-suited to the communities who need them 
most. For instance, requiring schools and districts to publish their stu-
dents’ academic performance disaggregated by race and ethnicity, ELL 
                                                                                                                      
83 There are other possible risks for this advocacy strategy. As James E. Ryan recently 
cautioned at the Rethinking Rodriguez: Education as a Fundamental Right Symposium at the 
Boalt Hall School of Law (Apr. 27-28, 2006), holding states accountable for providing re-
sources to achieve at high standards may have the perverse effects of (1) encouraging 
states to lower their standards for proficiency; (2) encouraging schools and teachers to 
narrow their curriculum to only those items that will be tested; and (3) providing states 
with an opportunity to demonstrate that schools are doing “good enough” on standards-
based tests so that courts will find them in compliance with state constitutions, despite 
dramatic inequality in educational resources among schools and districts. That said, each 
of these three criticisms could be equally directed at test-based accountability schemes, like 
the NCLB, even without court involvement. 
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status, and disability could provide a useful accountability tool to com-
munities and families. But this assumes several conditions that are not 
necessarily present in low-income communities with low-performing 
schools. First, data must be published in a clear, accessible way so that 
all may understand its meaning. Yet a recent study in California sug-
gests that the state’s mandated “school accountability report cards” 
(SARCs), which provide information on schools’ and districts’ student 
performance, facilities, and teacher qualifications, are too complex for 
most Californians to decipher.84 Next, disadvantaged communities 
must have the capacity to act meaningfully on this information. “Voting 
with their feet” is simply not an option for low-income families who 
cannot afford to move to higher performing school districts and 
schools.85
 This leaves only the “voice” option—political mobilization. Recall 
that Liebman and Sabel are optimistic that the new publics constituted 
by traditionally diverse interests (business and local community activ-
ists, for instance) will disentrench established political interests when it 
is “discovered” that local schools are failing.86 There is reason, however, 
to be less hopeful. For many families in low-income communities, 
group political mobilization is not a viable option. They may not pos-
sess the time and technical expertise to participate in sustained dia-
logue and school reform efforts. This leaves the very real possibility that 
                                                                                                                      
84 Gabriel Baca et al., Grading the Report Card: A Report on the Readability 
of the School Accountability Report Card (SARC) 4 (2005), available at http://www. 
idea.gseis.ucla.edu/publications/sarc/pdf/GradingSARCff-1.pdf. Of course abysmal schools 
in California may well be partially to blame for this situation. 
85 There is some evidence that realtors and home-buyers are among the most avid con-
sumers of school accountability data. David N. Figlio & Maurice E. Lucas, What’s in a 
Grade? School Report Cards and House Prices 24 (Nat’l Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in 
Educ., Occasional Paper No. 29, 2001). Those who have the means will choose homes in 
higher-performing school attendance zones. Id. (finding significant evidence that arbitrary 
distinctions embedded in school report cards lead to major housing price effects). Addi-
tionally, anecdotal evidence of wealthy flight from underperforming schools has made 
headlines. See Carrie Sturrock, Families Flee School’s Sinking Scores, S.F. Chron., Feb. 1, 2005, 
at A1 (describing the rapid middle-class enrollment decline—leaving behind low-income 
families—in the Oak Grove Middle School in Concord, California after the school had been 
deemed a “Program Improvement” school under the NCLB). 
86 See discussion supra notes 55–63 and accompanying text. Indeed some scholars, such 
as Jeannie Oakes and John Rogers, insist that traditional policy reform that is driven by 
technocrats without constituent “voice” will do little to further the cause of educational 
equality. See Jeannie Oakes & John Rogers, Learning Power: Organizing for Educa-
tion and Justice 21–33 (2006). Rather, meaningful equity-minded reform can only occur 
through grassroots organizing and political mobilization aimed at changing the powerful 
norms or “logics” that work to maintain the inequitable status quo. See id. at 158–63, 171, 
175. 
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disentrenched interests will re-trench as those who traditionally hold 
political clout (middle- and upper-middle-class whites and suburban 
communities) and educational technocrats will garner control over the 
new publics. Moreover, even if the right to an adequate education 
(whatever is necessary to ensure proficiency for at-risk children) were 
well-defined, the prospect of using litigation to enforce the right is dim 
given the costs and time associated with such an effort. Finally, the col-
lective action problem plaguing efforts to secure a public good such as 
an adequate public education will hinder even the most resolute indi-
viduals and small groups. To overcome the collective action problem, 
disadvantaged communities and individuals must find a way to amplify 
their voices and secure the educational resources necessary to allow 
their children to enjoy their educational rights and receive an adequate 
education. 
 Virtually none of the modern accountability systems formally and 
systematically hold policymakers and states accountable for what they 
can provide—the conditions and resources (i.e., the capacity) neces-
sary to reach proficiency targets.87 In other words, such systems lack 
meaningful reciprocal accountability. Such an accountability system 
would provide, in the words of Jeannie Oakes, Gary Blasi, and John 
Rogers, at least two missing components: (1) “[c]lear standards or 
benchmarks against which actors in the system can be measured . . . . 
[including] both learning outcomes students are expected to achieve 
and the resources and conditions necessary to support teachers and students to 
. . . produce those outcomes” and (2) “[l]egitimate roles for local com-
munities, parents, and students in holding the system accountable.”88
 What would such a meaningful reciprocal accountability system 
look like on the ground level? Some flexibility for local conditions is 
warranted here, but I would identify two major components. First, in 
the same way that a state’s department of education is often charged 
with the monitoring of data from and periodic inspection of local 
school districts in areas such as the implementation of special educa-
tion programs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act89 
or federal programs like free and reduced lunch programs, state de-
partments of education should supplement their obligation to moni-
tor student performance data with the monitoring of data regarding 
                                                                                                                      
87 Oakes et al., supra note 79, at 93. 
88 See id. at 93, 94 (emphasis added). 
89 See Nat’l Council on Disability, Back to School on Civil Rights 37 (2000), 
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2000/pdf/backtoschool.pdf  [here-
inafter Back to School]. 
2007] Achieving "Adequacy" in the Classroom 33 
opportunities to learn, and follow up with on-the-ground inspections 
to verify those data. Since the meeting of the “Chicago Group” (a 
group of experts in state monitoring systems for special education 
convened to lay out a blue print for a new system of special education 
monitoring in Texas), such a system of monitoring key performance 
or outcome indicators followed by heightened verification reviews and 
focused inspections that are tailored to local conditions has been the 
direction in which special education monitoring has been headed in a 
few states, including Texas and California.90 These monitoring and 
inspection mechanisms could easily be adapted to monitoring per-
formance, inputs, and processes for all students. 
                                                                                                                      
90 Cal. Dep’t Educ., Special Education Data Reports, http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/se/ 
ds/datarpts.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 2006); Tex. Educ. Agency, Office of Special Programs, 
Monitoring, & Interventions, Special Education Ad Hoc Reporting System, http://han 
cock.tea.state.tx.us/tea.spears.web (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). As described in the report 
by the National Council on Disability: 
The Texas work articulated five principles that provide the underpinnings for 
an effective state IDEA monitoring system. The system must (1) address all 
legal requirements and educational results for students, (2) include public 
involvement, (3) build on existing student data to increase system efficiency, 
(4) direct resources to areas of greatest need, and (5) result in timely verifica-
tion or enforcement of compliance. Their approach is based on the notion of 
continuous improvement with a data-based accountability system . . . . 
 At the heart of this system is the performance review process . . . . The 
state agency conducts a performance review of each LEA [local education 
agency]. The outcome of the review is used by the SEA [State Education 
Agency], in part, to place LEAs into one of four categories: (1) Continuous 
Improvement District—no additional compliance activities required by the 
state agency; (2) Data Validation District—sixty LEAs randomly selected an-
nually to verify reported data and examine procedural compliance; (3) At-
Risk District—self-study supplement to district improvement plan required; or 
(4) Focused-monitoring district—on-site investigation of specific areas of 
noncompliance conducted by the state . . . . 
 The state creates an investigation plan that is tailored to the identified ar-
eas of noncompliance prior to the visit. The plan is individualized for each 
LEA and must incorporate several features including focusing on measurable 
data that indicate compliance or noncompliance with the identified issue, 
classroom observation, and input from parents and students. Districts that are 
designated as “at-risk” or “focused monitoring” must have plans for correcting 
areas of noncompliance. Technical assistance and personnel training are pro-
vided to the LEA by the SEA if needed. The SEA must develop written proce-
dures that outline the progression from noncompliance findings to enforce-
ment so that they are consistently applied for each noncompliant LEA. These 
procedures should be clear to LEAs so that there is no doubt about the con-
sequences for ongoing noncompliance. 
Back to School, supra note 89, at 198–99. 
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 Second, an accessible and user-friendly system of complaints 
management should be available to students, parents, communities, 
and even teachers who believe that schools do not have the resources 
and conditions deemed necessary to reach proficiency targets. What-
ever resources and conditions are deemed—through adequacy litiga-
tion, legislation, or otherwise—necessary for children to enjoy an 
adequate education must be widely publicized both in and outside of 
school. Schools must also publicize that individual students, parents, 
teachers, and, perhaps, site administrators may file a complaint with a 
state oversight agency when such resources and conditions are not 
provided at the desk level. Such a complaint must be promptly inves-
tigated, findings issued, and a corrective action ordered. Already, simi-
lar systems are commonplace in special education. The goal, of 
course, is that with an order of noncompliance and corrective action 
in hand, the relevant provider—the state or local school district—will 
ensure that the child receives the necessary educational resources. 
 Tying this discussion together, modern adequacy litigation and 
standards-based accountability policies are beginning to work in tan-
dem to not only monitor and hold schools accountable for student 
performance, but also to specify the conditions and resources that 
provide the opportunity for all students, based on their needs, to 
reach proficiency. The final link in this chain of reciprocal account-
ability is a system of monitoring and complaints management that en-
sures meaningful opportunities for students, families, and communi-
ties, to hold policymakers, the state, and schools accountable for 
providing opportunities to learn. 
II. Educational Rights and Realities in California 
 This section explores California’s experience with education re-
form litigation and standards-based accountability policies with a par-
ticular eye toward opportunities for the kind of bottom-up account-
ability described in the previous section. 
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A. Serrano, Butt, and the Entitlement to “Basic Educational  
Equality” in California 
It therefore appears well settled that the California Constitution makes pub-
lic education uniquely a fundamental concern of the State and prohibits 
maintenance and operation of the common public school system in a way 
which denies basic educational equality to the students of particular dis-
tricts. The State itself bears the ultimate authority and responsibility to en-
sure that its district-based system of common schools provides basic equality 
of educational opportunity.91
 
 Having ruled in Serrano I that education was a “fundamental in-
terest” in California and that district wealth constituted a “suspect clas-
sification,”92 the California Supreme Court made it clear in Butt v. Cali-
fornia that it would apply strict scrutiny to any public policy or practice 
that denied the State’s children the fundamental right to basic educa-
tional equality.93 From a doctrinal perspective, one could hardly find 
judicial text more demanding of equality in educational policy-
making than the Serrano and Butt decisions. Yet the Serrano I decision 
has been criticized for failing to achieve its goal of creating equality of 
educational opportunity and failing to target educational resources to 
poor and minority children.94 Some have even blamed Serrano I for 
                                                                                                                      
 
91 See Butt v. California, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992). In Butt, the court approved a 
trial court’s order that the State had a duty to step in and prevent the Richmond Unified 
School District from closing its doors six weeks before the school year ended due to fiscal 
mismanagement because doing so would deny Richmond’s children their fundamental 
right to basic educational equality. Id. at 1264. 
92 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 1250 (Cal. 1971). 
93 842 P.2d at 1256. 
94 As one author argued: 
[M]any reformers had wrongly assumed that the revenue disparities targeted 
by Serrano were systematically related to race and income. In fact, a high pro-
portion of poor and minority students attended schools in high-revenue ur-
ban districts. Consequently, reducing revenue inequality at the district level 
did little to help disadvantaged students as a whole. Although California 
managed to achieve and maintain broad equity in school district funding, it 
ultimately did so in large part through relative declines in per pupil spending. 
For these and other reasons, many of the benefits envisioned by reformers in 
California failed to materialize. 
Heather Rose, The Concept of Adequacy and School Finance, in Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., 
School Finance and California’s Master Plan for Education 29, 31 ( John Sonstelie 
& Peter Richardson eds., 2001); see also John Sonstelie et al., Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., 
For Better or For Worse? School Finance Reform in California 26–31 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_200JSR.pdf (finding that inequalities 
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lowering overall educational spending in California relative to other 
states and “leveling down” the State’s once enviable K-12 educational 
system to the basement of the nation.95 Here I briefly examine the 
California Supreme Court’s two leading cases on the right to an edu-
cation—Serrano and Butt—as context for how that right has been re-
fined (or at least affected) by California’s experience with standards-
based accountability and the recent Williams v. California settlement.96
 In 1971, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, 
the Serrano I court effectively struck down a property-tax-based educa-
tional finance system that created glaring inter-district revenue ineq-
uities in the State.97 In finding that education was a fundamental in-
terest, the court relied on language from Brown v. Board of Education 
regarding the indispensable role of education in the modern indus-
trial state, and the influence of education in the development of a 
civic-minded citizenry.98 Moreover, the California court concluded 
that classifications based on an individual’s wealth required exacting 
scrutiny.99 Because of the unjust reality that poor people almost in-
variably lived in low property wealth school districts, the court re-
quired any funding scheme that made a child’s educational funding 
dependent upon the wealth of the district to be mandatorily subject 
to strict judicial scrutiny.100 The Serrano I court thereby adopted the 
fiscal neutrality principle and allowed the plaintiffs’ case to go for-
ward.101
 The California Supreme Court would not issue a decision on the 
merits in the Serrano litigation until December 30, 1976, more than five 
years after the Serrano I decision.102 Much happened in the interim. 
Most importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Rodriguez.103 
                                                                                                                      
in assessed property values and per-pupil school revenues in California were not systemati-
cally related to race, ethnicity, or family income prior to the Serrano decisions). 
95 See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Liti-
gation-Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 763, 792–93, 797 (1995); see 
also Sonstelie et al., supra note 94, at 90 (demonstrating California’s drop in school 
spending relative to other states since the 1970s). 
96 For two excellent and extensive discussions of the Serrano I decision and the politics 
and policymaking in its aftermath, see Sonstelie et al., supra note 94; Richard F. El-
more & Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, Reform and Retrenchment: The Politics of 
California School Finance Reform (1982). 
97 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), aff’d after remand 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
98 Id. at 1256–57. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
99 Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1250–55. 
100 See id. at 1263. 
101 Id. 
102 See Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
103 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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Also, the California legislature revamped the State’s school funding 
scheme, though the Serrano plaintiffs were not pleased with the reform 
effort.104
 After a sixty-day trial on whether the legislature’s reform efforts 
complied with Serrano I, a Los Angeles Superior Court Judge agreed 
with the plaintiffs and invalidated the State’s educational finance sys-
tem under the constitutional principles set forth in that decision.105 
The trial court ordered a new system which would produce per-pupil 
expenditure differences among districts of no more than one hundred 
dollars.106 In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Rodriguez decision, the 
California Supreme Court on appeal applied the California Constitu-
tion’s equal protection provision, rather than the federal Equal Pro-
tection Clause, to uphold the trial court’s conclusion.107 But the 
Serrano II court did little to clarify whether the constitutional concern 
was fiscal neutrality or horizontal equity.108 Nor did it reconcile the 
concept of fiscal neutrality with concerns about revenue-raising ability 
in those districts facing the challenges of children in poverty, ELLs, 
and the like, i.e., vertical equity.109
 After the Serrano decisions, the broad and fuzzy outlines of the 
right to education in California were in place: education was a fun-
damental interest worthy of strict scrutiny protection when infringed 
and, accordingly, the California school finance system was now re-
quired to at least provide basic equality in funding. In Butt v. Califor-
nia, the court revisited the constitutional standard set forth in Serrano 
and seemed to suggest that equality of educational opportunity under 
the State’s equal protection provision went beyond fiscal neutrality to 
“basic equality of educational opportunity.”110 The case addressed 
whether students’ fundamental right to an education had been in-
fringed when the Richmond Unified School District declared it would 
close six weeks early because it had run out of money.111 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court swiftly intervened and declared that this was a de-
nial of Richmond students’ right to basic educational equity, and or-
dered the State and the district to ensure that school remained in 
                                                                                                                      
104 See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 935–36. 
105 Id. at 931, 939. 
106 Id. at 940 n.21. 
107 Id. at 957–58. 
108 See id. at 939–47. 
109 See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 939–47. 
110 See Butt v. California, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992); Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1244 
(Cal. 1971). 
111 Butt, 842 P.2d at 1243. 
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session for the prescribed period of time.112 Still, basic educational 
equity remains elusive. It remains unclear whether this basic equity 
means equality of basic educational inputs, basic equality in educa-
tional outcomes, basic equality of educational inputs, basic equality to 
achieve a certain educational outcome, or some other standard not 
yet enunciated. 
 California’s Serrano decisions and the later gloss applied to them 
in Butt v. California, provide California students with a constitutional 
right to basic educational equality across school districts.113 In imple-
menting this right, the state legislature has chosen to focus on creat-
ing operating revenue equity by establishing revenue limits for school 
districts and narrowing the difference among such revenue limits over 
time.114 Moreover, due to the centralization of property tax alloca-
tions at the state level in the wake of the property tax limitation meas-
ure, Proposition 13,115 nearly all current noncategorical operating 
revenues are distributed through this revenue limit formula. Thus, we 
should see substantial equity in noncategorical state aid. Yet, neither 
horizontal nor vertical resource equity exist because districts are still 
free to raise discretionary funds through parcel taxes and private con-
tributions, and to raise facilities funding through general obligation 
bonds and developer fees.116 Moreover, significant state aid is still dis-
tributed through categorical programs, many of which are not tar-
geted to needy students.117 Finally, the State has done little to ensure 
that educational resources are sufficient in poor and minority schools 
so that all students reach the educational standards prescribed by 
standards-based reform efforts. 
B. The “New Accountability” in California 
 California, like most other states, has adopted an ambitious stan-
dards-based reform and accountability scheme that ties state interven-
tions, sanctions, and rewards to student performance on state-wide, 
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. at 1264. 
113 Serrano I, 487 P.2d. at 1244; Butt, 842 P.2d at 1243. 
114 See Christopher R. Lockard, Note, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, 
and Future of Education Finance Litigation in California, 57 Hastings L.J. 385, 388 (2005). 
115 Cal. Const. art. XIIIA. 
116 For a more detailed discussion of discretionary funding, see generally Eric Brunner & 
Jennifer Imazeki, Private Contributions and Public School Resources (San Diego State Univ., Ctr. 
for Pub. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 07-03, 2003), available at http://www-rohan.sdsu. 
edu/dept/econ/WPSeries/WorkingPaper0307.pdf. 
117 For a sampling of categorical state educational aid programs in California, see Cal. 
Dep’t of Educ., Categorical Programs (2006), http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/aa/ca. 
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standards-based assessments.118 Pursuant to the Public Schools Ac-
countability Act of 1999 (PSAA), all California public schools are held 
accountable for progress toward annual growth targets in each school’s 
academic performance index (API).119 API is primarily based on stu-
dent performance on the California Standards Test, a state-wide as-
sessment tied to the State’s educational content standards in the areas 
of English-language arts, mathematics, science, and history/social sci-
ence.120 Each year, each school’s API score, the school’s growth toward 
its targets, and the school’s rank in comparison to all state and demog-
raphically similar schools are reported publicly.121 Schools that meet 
certain performance targets may be eligible for rewards, while schools 
that fail to meet targets will initially receive a $50,000 planning grant 
and technical assistance followed by a $200 per-pupil implementation 
grant as part of the Immediate Intervention/Under-performing 
Schools Program (II/USP).122 Should schools fail to improve over a 
period of two years, they may be subject to a menu of sanctions, includ-
ing state takeover, reconstitution, or administration by an outside 
agency or organization—a step that has yet to be taken in any meaning-
ful way in any California school district.123 In some sense, one could 
argue that vertical equity is enhanced with the infusion of grant monies 
and technical assistance through the II/USP program. That said, while 
it is far too early to determine the effects of the PSAA, an early study 
demonstrates that it has done little to close the achievement gap be-
tween low- and high-performing schools nor has it stemmed the widen-
ing gap in teacher quality between such schools.124 At the turn of the 
century, the emerging accountability scheme had not yet assured basic 
                                                                                                                      
118 For a detailed description of California’s standards-based accountability system, see 
William S. Koski & Hillary Anne Weis, What Educational Resources Do Students Need to Meet 
California’s Educational Content Standards? A Textual Analysis of California’s Educational Con-
tent Standards and Their Implications for Basic Educational Conditions and Resources, 106 Tchrs. 
C. Rec. 1907 (2004). 
119 Cal. Educ. Code §§ 52050–52058 (West Supp. 2000). 
120 See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 52052(a)(2)(D)(4), 51210; see also Koski & Weis, supra note 
118, at 1915–18. 
121 See Cal. Educ. Code § 52042. 
122 See id. §§ 52053, 52053.5, 52054. 
123 See id. §§ 52053, 52053.5, 52054. It is also worth noting that California students, be-
ginning in 2006, will not be permitted to graduate unless they pass the standards-based 
High School Exit Examination. See id. §§ 60850–60851. 
124 Julian R. Betts & Anne Danenberg, The Effects of Accountability in California, in No 
Child Left Behind? The Politics and Practice of School Accountability 197, 199, 
209 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003). The authors preliminarily concluded, 
however, that those schools that chose to participate in and were selected for the II/USP 
experienced significant one-year achievement gains. Id. at 209. 
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educational equity, and did not stave off a state-wide lawsuit that sought 
to ensure that all students received basic educational necessities. 
C. Williams v. California and the State’s Obligation to Prevent, 
 Detect, and Correct 
 On the forty-sixth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 
hundreds of California students in dozens of schools in low-income 
communities sued the State for its failure to provide equality in even 
the basic educational necessities.125 That case, the most significant 
educational rights litigation in California since Serrano, was settled 
before trial.126 The settlement agreement did not focus on revamping 
California’s educational finance system.127 Instead, it provided for sig-
nificant reforms of the State’s system for monitoring and ensuring the 
provision of educational resources, including adequate instructional 
materials, clean and safe facilities, and qualified teachers, to all chil-
dren in the State.128 This section will not describe the heart-
wrenching educational conditions suffered by poor and minority stu-
dents in California that gave rise to the lawsuit,129 nor will it examine 
the doctrinal basis or legal strategy in the lawsuit. Rather, this section 
will summarize the settlement agreement and its implementing legis-
lation to highlight the evolving right to an education in California. 
Specifically, it focuses on the important procedural rights won by 
children in schools that “shock the conscience”130 to complain to lo-
                                                                                                                      
125 See generally First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Williams 
v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://www.decent 
schools.org/courtdocs/01FirstAmendedComplaint.pdf [hereinafter First Amended Com-
plaint]. The plaintiffs sought basic necessities such as quality teachers, adequate facilities, and 
appropriate instructional materials and curricula. See id. 
126 See generally Notice of Proposed Settlement, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 2004), available at http://www.decentschools.org/settlement/williams_no 
tice_settlement.pdf [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Settlement]. 
127 See id. at 6–8. 
128 Id. at 6–7. 
129 Others have expertly done this. See Jeannie Oakes & Martin Lipton, “Schools that Shock the 
Conscience”: Williams v. California and the Struggle for Education on Equal Terms Fifty Years After 
Brown, 11 Asian L.J. 234, 234 (2004); Linda Darling-Hammond, Access to Quality Teaching: An 
Analysis of Inequality in California’s Public Schools, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1045, 1103 (2003); 
Kenji Hakuta, English Language Learner Access to Basic Educational Necessities in 
California: An Analysis of Inequities 15, available at http://www.decentschools.com/ex-
pert_reports/hakuta_report.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2006); Jeannie Oakes & Marisa Saunders, 
Access to Textbooks, Instructional Materials, Equipment, and Technology: Inade-
quacy and Inequality in California’s Public Schools 37 (2002), available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=idea. 
130 First Amended Complaint, supra note 125, at 6. 
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cal and state officials and secure certain basic educational necessities. 
The section will conclude by describing a project undertaken by the 
Stanford Youth and Education Law Project aimed at making the Wil-
liams rights real at the desk level, and the conclusions the clinic drew 
from examining the monitoring and complaints mechanisms estab-
lished by the Williams litigation. 
1. The Williams Settlement and Reciprocal Accountability 
 After four years of intense and sometimes bitter litigation, settle-
ment was reached between representatives of the plaintiffs and Gov-
ernor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who had just months earlier succeeded 
Grey Davis in a gubernatorial recall election. The major terms of the 
deal included over $800 million in funding for facilities in the lowest 
performing schools; $138 million in aid for instructional materials; 
timetables for ensuring that “highly qualified” teachers as defined by 
the NCLB are available to all students; enhanced capacity and respon-
sibility of county superintendents to monitor local school districts’ 
provision of quality teachers, facilities, and instructional materials; 
and a uniform complaint process regarding inadequate instructional 
materials, teacher vacancies and misassignments, and emergency fa-
cilities problems.131 Five emergency bills to implement the settlement 
agreement were passed by the legislature and signed by the Governor 
in September 2004.132
 Although it remains to be seen how far the additional funding 
for textbooks and facilities will go and whether school districts will 
fulfill their NCLB and Williams obligation to provide a “highly quali-
fied” teacher for every classroom, two significant observations about 
the settlement can already be made. First, few disagree that the set-
tlement is merely a good first step toward substantive adequacy or 
equality of educational opportunity in California. According to the 
Williams attorneys, the suit was designed only to secure those basic 
                                                                                                                      
131 Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 126. 
132 Senate Bill 550 and Assembly Bill 2727 both established the complaints management 
system as well as minimum standards for school facilities, teacher quality, and instructional 
materials. See S.B. 550, 2004 S. (Cal. 2004); A.B. 2727, 2004 S. (Cal. 2004). Assembly Bill 1550 
eliminated multi-track, year-round schools. See A.B. 1550, 2004 S. (Cal. 2004). Assembly Bill 
3001 removed barriers for out-of-state teachers to become certified in California. See A.B. 
3001, 2004 S. (Cal. 2004). Lastly, Senate Bill 6 appropriated funds for emergency facilities 
repairs. See S.B. 6, 2002 S. (Cal. 2004). Copies of each bill may be found in the Order Regard-
ing Approval of Settlement Notice and Schedule, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 2004). 
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educational necessities that many California children were denied.133 
It was not aimed at ensuring that children enjoy all of the complex 
resources and conditions that would enable them to reach Califor-
nia’s high standards. In this regard, and unlike current adequacy liti-
gation, Williams was not intended to be the happy marriage between 
constitutional principle and educational policy. 
 Second, the Williams deal clarified the State’s obligation to pre-
vent, detect, and correct the denial of basic educational necessities, and 
provided children and their communities both a monitoring system 
and procedural rights to hold the State accountable for that obliga-
tion.134 There are three primary aspects to this monitoring and recip-
rocal accountability system. First, the county superintendents are obli-
gated to conduct inspections and report to the public and State on 
school districts’ provision of clean, safe facilities; qualified teachers; and 
sufficient, appropriate textbooks.135 Second, school districts are re-
quired to conduct public hearings on the availability of textbooks, to 
generate SARCs that provide information on, among other things, stu-
dent demographics, teacher qualifications, and performance on the 
state standards test.136 Third, the Williams deal created a uniform com-
plaints system that requires schools to post in every classroom the right 
to qualified teachers, sufficient textbooks, and clean, safe facilities as 
well as the right to file a compliance complaint with local and state offi-
cials.137 The Williams litigation is, in a rough sense, out-of-step with 
modern adequacy litigations as it did not aim to establish the right to 
educational resources that would enable children to obtain certain 
skills and proficiencies.138 However, unlike other lawsuits, it recognizes 
the central importance of reciprocal accountability of the State to those 
in classrooms and communities.139
2. Monitoring the Williams Settlement 
 During the Winter Semester of 2006, students in the Youth and 
Education Law Project (YELP),140 in collaboration with the private 
                                                                                                                      
 
133 See Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 126, at 1. 
134 See id. at 7. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 126, at 1. 
139 See id. 
140 YELP is an in-house legal clinic at the Stanford Law School that provides free legal 
services to disadvantaged children and their communities in education-related matters. 
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civil rights firm and Williams plaintiffs’ attorneys, Public Advocates, 
Inc., launched a pilot project through which public interest and pri-
vate attorneys would “monitor the monitors” by examining the moni-
toring and compliance activities of county superintendents and a tar-
geted local school district. Specifically, YELP monitored the Williams 
implementation work of the San Mateo County Office of Education 
and the Ravenswood City School District in East Palo Alto, a very low-
performing and virtually one hundred percent “minority” kindergar-
ten through eighth grade district of approximately 4500 students.141 
The pilot project demonstrated both the excellent potential of recip-
rocal monitoring and complaints systems, as well as their distinct 
weakness. 
 Both the district (in large part) and the County Superintendent 
(nearly to the letter) complied with inspection and public disclosure 
obligations during the first full year of Williams implementation. Their 
own inspection and monitoring uncovered deficiencies in teacher as-
signments and the condition of facilities, as well as a handful of other 
material shortfalls. But even this inspection and monitoring will not 
be sufficient if local and state officials do not take the necessary steps 
to come into compliance. This observation, coupled with the alarm-
ing finding that not one Williams compliance complaint was filed in 
Ravenswood during the first year of implementation, demonstrates a 
potentially debilitating gap in reciprocal accountability schemes: local 
stakeholders must be apprised and aware of their rights, must be 
trained to identify denials of those rights, and must exercise their 
procedural rights and voice so they may not only complain to remedy 
the deficient conditions but also follow-up with state and local officials 
to hold them to account. While the reasons for the lack of use of the 
complaints system in Ravenswood remain unknown, other California 
school districts in which community groups and organizers reached 
out to parents and students received multiple complaints regarding 
                                                                                                                      
Through litigation and policy advocacy, YELP aims to ensure that all children enjoy excel-
lent and equal educational opportunities. The author is YELP’s director. The Williams 
project was overseen by Molly Dunn, the Clinic’s Youth Advocacy Fellow, managed by Stan-
ford law student Christine Sebourn, and conducted by Christine and her fellow students 
Marc Tafolla Young, Carolyn Jacobs Chachkin, Tara Heuman, and Tim Sanders. My thanks 
to the team for a job well done. 
141 For more information on the Ravenswood City School District, see Ed-Data, District 
Reports, Ravenswood City Elementary District (2005-2006), available at http://www.ed-
data.k12.ca.us/welcome.asp (follow “Reports - District” hyperlink; then click “San Mateo” 
under county and click “Ravenswood City Elementary District” under district). 
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deficient conditions.142 Reciprocal accountability works, but training 
and outreach are necessary to ensure that communities long margin-
alized in the education reform debate can begin to make rights real 
in the classroom. 
Conclusion 
 Adequacy litigation and standards-based, educational accountabil-
ity policies are reshaping the educational landscape, and hold the po-
tential to establish rights to resources, conditions, and, ultimately, out-
comes that would benefit the most disadvantaged students. But rights 
are abstract. Quality teachers, challenging curricula, functioning sci-
ence labs, school guidance counselors, safe and clean facilities, and 
preschool programming are real. How can the state know that any of 
these resources are missing from the classroom? How can students, 
parents, and teachers hold the district and state accountable to provide 
for these rights? As unfashionable as it may be to speak of monitoring 
and procedural safeguards, such methods of reciprocal accountability 
may be necessary, though hardly sufficient, to achieve adequacy in the 
classroom. 
                                                                                                                      
142 See, e.g., Luis Zaragoza, Teens March for Schools, San Jose Mercury News, July 27, 2006, 
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